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Introduction
The March 11, 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami (hereafter “3.11 Earthquake”) in Japan
caused significant destruction and chaos at the same time. The Japanese government, though
generally doing well in the disaster relief, was largely criticized by the general public for its
“failure to insist on adequate safety measures, its lack of advance preparations to manage and
care for evacuees, and, above all, its failure to disclose critical information to affected persons in
a timely manner.”1 Following such a critique, many Japanese scholars have argued that local
governments should be empowered to provide more effective assistance, since almost all the
practical disaster relief programs were carried out on the local level, and the central government
appeared to simply complicate and delay the process.2 The ruling party since 2009, the
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), responded to these criticisms and demands by enacting
reforms to decentralize emergency power in June 2012. However, the opposing Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP), which became the leading party in Japan following General Election in
December 2012, claimed that the government’s failure was a result of the central government not
having enough power to handle disaster relief effectively. Correspondingly, in April 2012, the
LDP proposed a Draft Amendment to the Constitution of Japan (hereafter “Draft Amendment”),
in which they added an Emergency Clause to the Constitution “based on the reflections of
governmental response [and failure] during the 3.11 Earthquake.”3 The Emergency Clause, as
written in the draft, would grant the Prime Minister the power to declare a state of emergency “in

Lawrence Repeta. "Japan’s Democracy at Risk – The LDP’s Ten Most Dangerous Proposals for Constitutional
Change," The Asia-Pacific Journal. Volume 11, Issue 28, Number 3. July 14, 2013.
<http://apjjf.org/2013/11/28/Lawrence-Repeta/3969/article.html>
2
See “chapter 6: repurposing local government” in Richard J. Samuels’ 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan.
3
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the event of…large-scale natural catastrophes due to earthquakes, etc.,”4 during which time the
Cabinet would be able to “enact Cabinet Orders having the same effect as laws.”5 This Draft
Amendment has not been passed yet as of today, but the LDP has been continuously promoting
in public speeches and political campaigns, and is still putting in great effort to get it passed.
The difference between the responses of the DPJ and the LDP is very puzzling but also very
interesting. The fact that they make conflicting responses shows that they are taking away
different lessons from the governmental failure in disaster relief. Why did that happen? In order
to answer this question, I would like to compare the 3.11 Earthquake with another serious
disaster, which took place in the U.S, the August 2005 Hurricane Katrina. Similar to the Japanese
case, government disaster relief response to Hurricane Katrina was also heavily criticized.
However, the criticism was a little bit different, for in the U.S, it is the state’s responsibility to
declare its own state of emergency in order to receive federal resources and funds, or more
specifically, from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). During Hurricane
Katrina, the miscommunication and ineffective cooperation between FEMA and the state of
Louisiana was largely criticized as one of the major causes for the large number of deaths in the
city of New Orleans. In response, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006
restructured FEMA and at the same time granted the president more power for providing disaster
relief. Generally speaking, the central government’s power was strengthened.
As noted above, Japan’s two parties, the DPJ and the LDP, took completely opposite views
on whether the emergency power should be centralized or localized as a lesson learnt from the
3.11 Earthquake. The LDP’s plan concurred with the U.S government’s path to strengthen the
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power of the central government, while the DPJ’s changes went in the opposite direction and
strengthened local power instead. Given that Japan and the U.S both experienced severe natural
disasters and are both democratic regimes with well-functioning governments, some may argue
that Japan should follow the same path that the U.S took and also strengthen its central
government. However, besides the similarities, the two countries also have many differences
which may cause their best choices for policy reform to be completely different. The goal of this
paper is to analyze the causes for governmental responses in the two countries towards the
natural disasters and the factors that led to their policy reforms afterwards. After this analysis, we
will be able to decide whether the DPJ or the LDP holds a more convincing argument in terms of
policy reform after the disaster relief period of the 3.11 Earthquake.
The first step towards answering these questions will require detailed comparison between
the two countries in various aspects. First of all, there are fundamental differences in the political
structures in Japan and the U.S, despite the fact that they are both liberal democratic regimes.
Similarities and differences exist between the two countries in political institutions and political
dynamics, both at the central level and in the central-local relations. The background section will
examine the similarities and differences in political institutions and dynamics between Japan and
the U.S which could have influenced either the disaster relief procedure or the policy reform
afterwards.
Besides the political differences, the type and dimension of the disasters also played critical
roles during and after the disaster relief period. Section two of this paper will compare various
aspects of the two disasters and discuss the similarities and differences. One of the most obvious
and important difference is that a hurricane can be predicted through weather forecasting but an
earthquake cannot. This difference in predictability, together with many other differences
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between hurricane and earthquake as natural disasters, serves as a significant factor that
influenced both the actions taken during the disaster relief period, and the policy reform
thereafter.
A third section consist of two case studies will focus on how the governments of the U.S and
Japan managed the disaster relief and evacuation period and what were their failures, since only
after learning about the governmental failures could we make judgements on the correct lesson to
learn from those failures. This section will examine the different means each government utilized
to respond to the disaster, how the factors described in the first and second sections contributed
towards such differences, and what kind of criticism was directed against the governmental
actions during disaster relief and evacuation period.
But that is only half the story. It is not enough to know what the governmental responses
during the disaster relief period were, but also why the two governments made different
decisions thereafter. The fourth section will analyze the different policy reforms (enacted or
proposed) after the disaster relief period, what led to them, and whether those causes were
logical conclusions to be made after careful analysis of governmental failures.
Finally, based on the findings in the detailed analyses, the conclusion section will evaluate
the significance of all factors during the disaster relief period and for the policy reforms. It will
first determine the most influential factors that caused governmental failures in the disaster relief
period, then make a judgement on the factors that drove political leaders to pursue certain policy
reforms. The current political situation in Japan in regards to these reforms will also be touched
upon at the end.
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Background
In order to understand the two countries’ responses during and after the disaster relief
period, we must understand first how these two governments function. Although both Japan and
the United States are liberal democracies, the governmental structure and political dynamics
differ a great deal in regards to the decision-making process in the central government and the
central-local relationship. Structure-wise, the two countries have three major differences that
play a role in influencing or determining governmental decisions during the disaster relief
period: 1) system of government on the central level, 2) central-local power balance and 3)
distribution of emergency power between central and local governments. Besides structural
factors, there are three contingent factors that influence government decisions of reform policies:
1) public opinion and criticism, 2) the dynamics of the political parties, and 3) the political
interest of political parties. This section will offer an introduction of all these six factors.
The most important and obvious difference between the central governments in Japan and
the U.S is the presence of a parliamentary system versus a presidential system. The U.S has a
presidential system, in which the President is elected through direct election and does not need to
be a member of the Congress to be eligible for the presidency. As Alexis de Tocqueville points
out in his famous Democracy in America, “care was taken not to subordinate [the president’s]
will to that of a council, a dangerous expedient which both clogs government action and lessens
the ruler’s responsibility.”6 In Japan, however, the parliamentary system is designed so that “the
Prime Minister shall be designated from among the members of the Diet by a resolution of the
Diet” (Article 62)7. In other words, the Prime Minister has to be a member of the Diet, and is

Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America. p.121.
The Constitution of Japan. Promulgated on November 3, 1946. Came into effect on May 3, 1947.
<http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html>
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appointed by the party that has a majority in the Diet. Because of this difference, a president may
go against the Congress even if his party is taking the lead, whereas a Prime Minister is usually a
representative for his party’s policy interests.
In terms of executive power, then generally speaking the President has much greater power
than the Prime Minister. In the United States, to become a law, a bill must be presented to and
receive approval from the Congress and then signed by the President. The President also has veto
power to prevent the law from coming into effect. However, in Japan, Article 41 of the
Constitution suggests that “the Diet shall be the highest organ of state power, and shall be the
sole law-making organ of the State.”8 According to this article, the Diet is able to decide on all
laws by itself without asking the Prime Minister’s permission. Although the Prime Minister holds
the power to dissolve the lower house of the Diet, his power is still largely restrained by the two
houses of the Diet. Thus in the central government, the U.S has a tendency towards strong and
centralized power, whereas the Japanese system prefers pluralism and collective decision
making.
Shifting our focus to central-local relations, we discover that the balance of power between
the state and the federal governments has been one of the major concerns of the U.S politics
since its foundation. Soon after the establishment of the country, extensive debates took place
between Federalists led by Alexander Hamilton and Democratic-Republicans led by Thomas
Jefferson in regards to central-local relations. In short, Federalists argued for more power granted
towards the Federal government, whereas Democratic-Republicans argued for more power
granted towards the State governments. Eventually an agreement was made with compromises of
both sides, creating the Constitution which granted the federal government certain essential

8
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powers while leaving the state enough autonomy for its daily operation. However, the
Constitution did not settle down the dispute, and there are still constant debates as to whether the
federal government or state government should make decisions in certain circumstances.
The situation is quite different in Japan. After World War II, the Japanese government and
people became suspicious and vigilant of strong leadership,9 and the 1947 Constitution shows a
clear intention to strengthen the local governments. Article 92 of Japanese Constitution notes,
“regulations concerning organization and operations of local public entities shall be fixed by law
in accordance with the principle of local autonomy,”10 securing local governments’ freedom to
operate without interference. Furthermore, Article 95 states that “a special law, applicable only to
one local public entity, cannot be enacted by the Diet without the consent of the majority of the
voters of the local public entity concerned, obtained in accordance with law,” protecting local
governments from direct control of the central government. In terms of public spending, Richard
J. Samuels points out that the local governments in Japan accounted for “nearly 60 percent of all
public spending”11 in 2011, which is very significant given that in the U.S case, state and local
governments together account for only around 42 percent of all public spending.12
Besides the general relationship, the most relevant issue pertaining to the central-local
relation for this paper would be the use of emergency power in the event of natural disasters,
which is defined in very different ways in the two countries. First of all, both countries do have
articles in their Constitutions concerning governmental operations during a “state of emergency,”
but those articles only deal with emergencies regarding national security. The emergency in

Nakasone, Yasuhiro. Connors, Leslie, trans. The Making of the New Japan: Reclaiming the Political Mainstream.
Routledge. 1999. p.222.
10
The Constitution of Japan. Promulgated on November 3, 1946. Came into effect on May 3, 1947.
11
Samuels, Richard J. 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan. Cornell University Press, 2013. p.151.
12
In 2015, for the total of $6.4 trillion government spending, 3.7 trillion is attributed to the federal government.
<http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/total_2015USrt_18rs5n>
9
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terms of natural disasters in the U.S is handled by a collective force of the individual states and a
federal agency named “the Federal Emergency Management Agency” (FEMA), an agency
established by the United States Department of Homeland Security by executive order.13 The
Stafford Act rules that Individual states are expected to declare a state of emergency during
natural disasters and then request a federal declaration of emergency in the designated state by
the president in order to receive physical and monetary support from FEMA.14 The balance of
power here is that although individual states could declare their own “state of emergency”, the
federal declaration is the only credential for states to receive financial and material support
during a natural disaster. In short, FEMA provides the supplies, and individual states carry out
practical disaster relief programs.
In contrast, in Japan, emergency power in circumstances of natural disasters is largely
granted towards the local governments by the Basic Act of Disaster Counterplan.15 Since natural
disasters are very common in Japan, the local governments have developed effective and
efficient procedures in dealing with them. According to the Basic Act of Disaster Counterplan,
besides the responsibility of conducting disaster relief activities, the financial burden of disaster
relief it to be assumed by the local government, and the Cabinet only establishes a special
committee to provide monetary support to local governments only in the extent of a particularly
damaging earthquake or disaster.16 Generally, in Japan disaster relief takes place largely on the
local level.
Besides the structural factors, there are other contingent factors that influence decision-

“Executive Order 12127--Federal Emergency Management Agency.” <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo12127.htm>
14
See the detailed clauses of the Stafford Act. <https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/138315366995521f970b19e8eaa67087b7da9f4af706e/stafford_act_booklet_042213_508e.pdf>
15
Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act 災害対策基本法. <http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S36/S36HO223.html>
16
Section 2 of Article 28 of the Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act.
13
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making process in terms of policy reforms. Since natural disasters all take place unexpectedly, it
is usually the established emergency procedures that guide the disaster relief period. However,
for the policy reforms, there is a longer time for politicians to make their decisions based on
contingent factors. First is the public opinion and criticism towards governmental actions. This is
the most volatile factor since it is very case-sensitive and is directly related to the specific
government responses and failures for a certain event. As a result, we will put off the discussion
of the comparison between Japan and the U.S on this aspect to the political reform section.
The second contingent factor is party dynamics. Although the Congress in the U.S and the
Diet in Japan both have two branches in which members in the upper house serve a longer term
of 6 years whereas those in the lower serve a shorter term, the outcome of elections has been
very different for the two countries. The relationship between political parties and the dynamic of
political warfare also differ a lot between the U.S and Japan.
In the U.S, there are two major players, the Republican Party and the Democratic Party,
which represent the right and the left in terms of political ideology. The alternation between two
parties in both the Congress and the presidency takes place frequently, and it is not a rare case
when the president does not belong to the party which holds the majority in the Congress.
When we look at Japan, we see a very different case: the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),
since its formation in 1955 until today, with short exceptions in 1993-1996 and in 2009-2012,
has basically been the majority party for Japan’s entire postwar time period. Although generally
a conservative party, the LDP has developed within it many factions which represent a wide
ideological range from extreme conservatism to moderate liberalism. The major opposition party
and the only party which has been able to defeat the LDP by itself is the Democratic Party of
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Japan (DPJ), which holds a more liberal ideology.17 However, since the LDP provides a wide
range of ideological possibilities, it has been constantly able to appeal to various groups of
people and secured the majority of seats in the Diet. Generally, there is no frequent alternation of
parties in Japan’s Diet and the position of Prime Minister.
Besides the overall dynamics between political parties, the political goals of parties also
differ. For the subject matter of this analysis, the political goal that plays the most important role
is the amendment of the Constitution. The perception of Constitutional amendments is very
different between Japan and the U.S. Although the Japanese Constitution, just as the U. S’, can
be amended by a two-third majority in the parliament together with a certain form of local
approval,18 the real practice has been very different. In the United States, to date, thirty-three
Constitutional amendments have been proposed and passed by the two-third majority of the
Congress, among which twenty-seven were ratified by the necessary three fourth of the fifty
states. Generally, these Constitutional amendments have played essential roles in supplementing
and clarifying the original Constitution as well as supporting human right movements.
In contrast, in Japan, nearly 70 years after the Constitution came into effect in 1947, no
constitutional amendment has been ratified by referendum of people or even been approved by
the Diet by a two thirds majority. It has been the LDP’s political goal to amend the Constitution
for several decades,19 but it has never been successful. Regardless of why the Constitution has
not been amended for 70 years, this simple fact clearly reveals that the political evaluation of

The LDP held a monopoly since its establishment in 1955 until 1993, when it was defeated by a coalition of
seven small parties. The coalition government collapsed in 1996, and the LDP came back to power again. In 2009,
the DPJ became the first party which could defeat the LDP in an election by itself.
18
Article 5 of the U.S Constitution and article 97 of Japanese Constitution specify the procedure for amendment.
For the local approval, in the U.S case, an amendment should be approved by three fourth of the states. In the
Japanese case, a national referendum must approve the amendment by a simple majority.
19
Lawrence Repeta. "Japan’s Democracy at Risk – The LDP’s Ten Most Dangerous Proposals for Constitutional
Change," The Asia-Pacific Journal. Volume 11, Issue 28, Number 3. July 14, 2013.
17
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Constitutional amendments in Japan and the U.S are very different. Thus in terms of the
significance and the perception of Constitutional amendments, there are also differences between
Japan and the U.S.

The Disasters
Aside from the political and systematic factors, the natural disaster itself also has a great
impact over both the procedure of disaster relief and the policy reform thereafter. But before
going into the analysis of the effect of the two disasters, we first must understand what the two
disasters were. This section will produce a general picture of the 3.11 Earthquake in Japan in
2011 and Hurricane Katrina in the U.S in 2005.
At 14:46 on March 11, 2011, the third largest earthquake ever recorded in human history hit
the northeast region of Japan.20 The depth of the earthquake was 24 kilometers, and the intensity
and the magnitude of the earthquake reached an astonishing level of 7 on Japan Meteorological
Agency seismic intensity scale and 9.0 on the Richter magnitude scale. Three prefectures, Iwate,
Miyagi, and Fukushima suffered the most severe damage and were also devastated by a tsunami
that hit the coastal areas within two hours of the earthquake. 15,866 of deaths were recorded,
while 2,946 went missing. More than 130,000 houses were completely destroyed, with 260,000
50% destroyed and 717,000 damaged.21
Soon after the earthquake took place, local residents, the local government and the central
government all launched their emergency procedures. 346,000 disaster victims either found their
way to or were successfully carried to designated evacuation zones. By June of the same year,

Emergency Disaster Headquarters 緊急災害対策本部. Regarding the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami in
Japan「平成 23 年(2011 年)東北地方太平洋沖地震(東日本大震災)について」. p.1.
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/saigai/pdf/201206261700jisin.pdf>
21
Ibid. p.2.
20
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53,089 temporary housing were built for the use of disaster victims. With the help of the Police
Department, the Fire Department, the Coastal Police, and the Self Defense Force, a total of
27,157 victims were rescued from either their collapsed houses or the sea.22 Aftershocks
continued for several months and among them 4 had intensities of 6.0 or higher, but with good
management, no significant damage occurred.23
The most unexpected disaster, indeed not a natural disaster but more a man-made one, was
not the earthquake or the tsunami, but the explosion that took place shortly after the tsunami hit
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant which was operated by the Tokyo Electric Power
Company (TEPCO).24 As several reactors failed to shut down or cool down, the nuclear power
plant was hit by the tsunami. As a result, several reactors melt down and leaked out nuclear
radiation. Although not known at that time, the accident was measured Level 7 on the
International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES), the same level as the Chernobyl
Disaster. Since the central government had never dealt with such a disaster before, it failed to
evacuate people from the affected areas in a timely manner and wasted five days to extend the
radius of evacuation zone from an original 3 km to the final 20 km, which very likely caused
residents to be exposed to radiation. The central government was severely criticized for its late
response, inconsistence, and failure to disclose detailed information about the investigation of
and treatment to the disaster.
On the U.S side, a hurricane which formed on August 23, 2005 was named “Katrina” on
August 24 and it made its landfall in Florida on August 25.25 It then moved towards the north
Ibid. pp. 46-47.
Ibid. p.5.
24
Investigation Committee on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power
Company. Reports of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Disaster. July 23, 2012.
<http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/post-3.html>
25
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared-Special Report of the committee On Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 2006.
22
23
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and affected Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi and caused a total of 1,577 deaths as
of May 2006, a number almost four times the 400 deaths caused by twentieth century’s most
lethal hurricane, the 1935 “Labor Day Hurricane” in Florida. In terms of the scale of destruction,
90,000 square miles of land area were damaged by the Hurricane Katrina, which was equivalent
to the land area of the United Kingdom. 300,000 homes were destroyed or made unlivable, with
an estimated economic loss of $125 to $150 billion.
Although many states and areas were affected, the state of Louisiana suffered the most
damage from the hurricane: around a thousand people lost their lives. According to the Data
Center, “the major causes of the death include: drowning (40%), injury and trauma (25%), and
heart conditions (11%). Nearly half of all victims were over the age of 74.”26 The unemployment
rate in Louisiana rose from 5.6 percent in August to 12.1 percent in September. The population of
New Orleans, the most affected city, also experienced a sharp decline after the disaster as a result
in residents’ distrust of the government. With a population of 484,674 before Katrina (as of April
2000), New Orleans only had 230,172 residents after Katrina (as of July 2006). Almost half of
the people left, and even with the gradual return of residents, by July of 2015, the population was
still only 386,617, which was still only around 80 percent of the original population.
The major cause of the dissatisfaction of the residents of New Orleans was the ineffective
evacuation process. Michael Brown, the former Director of FEMA, happened to come into huge
disagreement and conflict with Kathleen Blanco, the former Governor of the State of Louisiana,
shortly after Hurricane Katrina was detected. Since the Louisiana State was supposed to receive
support from FEMA, evacuation was delayed due to lack of transportation and security forces

<https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=462746>
26
Plyer, Allison. “Facts for Features: Katrina Impact.” The Data Center. August 26, 2016.
<http://www.datacenterresearch.org/data-resources/katrina/facts-for-impact/>
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necessary to guard the evacuation. As a “last resort,” Blanco and the Mayor of New Orleans, Ray
Nagin, decided to open the Super Dome located in the center of the city for those who were
unable to evacuate.27 However, because the Super Dome was simply an empty stadium with
little or no supplies and space, this “last resort” was largely criticized by the general public.
Furthermore, the collapse of the levees built by the government worsened the situation: flood
came into the City of New Orleans and caused significant number of deaths of drowning.
There are similarities and differences between these two disasters. Both 3.11 Earthquake
and Hurricane Katrina destroyed broad lands and countless houses, and caused numerous deaths.
Both required supplies such as water, food, shelter, etc. to be provided to the victims. But there
were also differences. Both earthquake and nuclear leakage are unpredictable, while hurricane
can be forecasted several days before landfall. For an earthquake, the most important disaster
relief action is rescuing victims from the collapsed building. Although evacuation is essential in
cases of both nuclear leakage and hurricane, people who fail to evacuate from the radiation zone
would inevitably be exposed towards radiation, whereas people who fail to evacuate from
hurricane zone could still survive the hurricane if there are well-prepared shelters and strong
levees.

Evacuation and Disaster Relief
As indicated in the previous sections, there are four variables that have the capacity to
impact governmental decisions during a disaster relief period, which are the three systematic
differences—namely 1) the system of government in the central level, 2) the central-local power
balance and 3) the distribution of emergency power—and 4) the nature of the natural disasters.

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared-Special Report of the committee On Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 2006. p.12.
27
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This section will examine how these four factors influenced government responses in the disaster
relief period and which factors contributed to the governmental failures in this process.
Let us start with the U.S case. Under the presidential system, the U.S president in 2005,
George W. Bush, responded quickly after the hurricane was detected. As the timeline in
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared indicates, Katrina was first discovered at 4 pm on
August 23 as a “tropical depression,” then on August 25 ratified as a hurricane and named
Katrina shortly before its landing in Florida at 5:30 pm.28 Within three days, President Bush
issued federal emergency declarations for states that were influenced by the hurricane, including
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.29 It was a very unusual step to take because only
Louisiana had requested the declaration before he issued it. Later on, President Bush even took
the initiative to personally call Governor Blanco to urge a mandatory evacuation.30 Although he
did not return to Washington from his Texas ranch to convene his Cabinet until two days after
landfall, he still did and was able to take necessary steps to start the emergency procedures.
However, even though the emergency system was activated, due to a poor federal-state
relationship during the disaster, the evacuation process in many stricken areas and especially in
New Orleans, Louisiana was conducted very poorly with miscommunications in various aspects.
Since the central-local relations both in general and in terms of emergency power were balanced
out between the federal and state governments in the U.S, the disaster relief could only go on
well when FEMA and the states cooperate with each other well. Whenever FEMA and the
individual state(s) get in conflict, the disaster relief procedure will stick in a deadlock—and that

Ibid. p.67.
The White House. “Statement on Federal Emergency Assistance for Louisiana.” August 27, 2005.
<https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050827-1.html>
30
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared-Special Report of the committee On Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 2006. p.7.
28
29
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was what happened during Hurricane Katrina. Governor Blanco of Louisiana and Director
Brown of FEMA had disagreements on various topics including but not limited to the number of
buses, the extent of military support, and the general evacuation plans that were supposed to be
given to the state of Louisiana. For example, the argument about buses was noted in Hurricane
Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared:
“On Monday, Governor Blanco asked Brown for buses, and Brown assured the state the same
day that 500 buses were enroute to assist in the evacuation of New Orleans and would arrive
within hours. In spite of Brown’s assurances and the state’s continued requests over the
course of the next two days, FEMA did not direct the U.S. Department of Transportation to
send buses until very early on Wednesday, two days after landfall. The buses did not begin to
arrive until Wednesday evening, and not in significant numbers until Thursday.”31
The disagreement in regards to the extent of military support was similar. Governor Blanco
claimed that the military support that she had requested from FEMA was delayed for a long time
that she had to utilize the small number of National Guards in Louisiana to assist with the
evacuation progress, which was not sufficient. However, Director Brown provided a very
different if not opposite perspective in his testimony before Congress. In the testimony, he
claimed that he “had numerous conversations with Governor Blanco specifically asking about
mandatory evacuations…but for whatever reason, Mayor Nagin and Governor Blanco were
reticent to order a mandatory evacuation.”32 No one knows who initiated the conflict between
Director Brown and Governor Blanco, but it is clear that there were significant
miscommunications and misunderstandings involving federal evacuation assistance.

Ibid. p.15.
“Former FEMA Director Testifies Before Congress.” New York Times. September 27, 2005.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/27/national/nationalspecial/former-fema-director-testifies-before-congress.html>
31
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Indeed, many have argued that it was this delay in initiating the evacuation that caused the
greatest number of deaths during Hurricane Katrina. A Failure of Initiative, or the Final Report
of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina suggests that “the incomplete pre-landfall evacuation led to deaths, thousands of
dangerous rescues, and horrible conditions for those who remained.”33 The report goes on
specifying that “hundreds of people [who did not get evacuated] died in their homes or other
locations, presumably from drowning.” Given that the total in-state deaths for hurricane Katrina
in Louisiana was around a thousand,34 and the total deaths of about 1,200 according to the
National Hurricane Center,35 the delayed evacuation process has clearly been one of the most
significant causes for deaths during Hurricane Katrina. A Failure of Initiative argues that the
major cause of the delay in evacuation was that despite the adequate warning which took place
56 hours before landfall, Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin delayed the order of a mandatory
evacuation in New Orleans until 19 hours before landfall.36 But since we are aware of the
disagreements between Governor Blanco and Director Brown, we would understand that this
delay is not simply a failure on the state’s side, but a result of the ineffective cooperation of both
sides.
However, there are also several failures for which Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin of
New Orleans must take responsibility for: the “last resort” usage of the Superdome, and the
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fragility of levees in New Orleans. The New Orleans’ Superdome was widely referred to as “last
resort” quite literally. Since the evacuation started very late and that the number of buses to carry
residents out of the danger zone and the military support to assist the evacuation were
insufficient, the government eventually failed to evacuate or assist in the evacuation of more than
70,000 individuals before the landfall.37 As a result, the city government directed all remaining
residents to the Superdome which served as a shelter when the hurricane hit. The Superdome had
been used as a shelter for Hurricane Georges in 1998, but it nonetheless was extremely
unprepared to shelter such a large number of people, both space-wise and resource-wise.38 With
insufficient water, food, electricity, medical care, etc., the evacuees in Superdome largely felt that
they were “abandoned” by the government.39
The ineffectiveness of levees in New Orleans also led to flooding in the city, which together
with the numerous people who were not evacuated, caused numerous deaths. The levees were
criticized for various reasons including breaches and overtopping in various locations, design
and construction issues, lack of proper oversight, and the geographical subsidence in the
metropolitan New Orleans area.40 These reasons may seem scattered all reveal one essential
problem: that the city of New Orleans was unprepared for emergency responses to floods and
hurricanes. Indeed, the problems of levees and the delay in evacuation are both specifically
harmful for hurricanes. For a hurricane, if the preparation step of evacuation and construction of
levees can be managed effectively, many people and buildings will survive the disaster.
Shifting our focus to Japan, we will now track how Japan responded to the 311 Earthquake
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with its parliamentary system, its powerful local governments, its tradition of local communities
working together in disaster relief, and the unexpected emergency caused by the Fukushima
nuclear leakage. In contrast to the more concentrated power of the president and FEMA in the
U.S, the emergency power in Japan for the 311 Earthquake was shared by a temporary
emergency committee that was established soon after main shock took place at 14:46 on March
11, 2011. Disaster Management in Japan published by Japanese government notes that
“according to the level of damage, the government may establish the Headquarters for Major
Disaster Management (headed by the Minister of State for Disaster Management) or the Extreme
Disaster Management Headquarters (headed by the Prime Minister), to establish the policies for
the disaster countermeasures, and to coordinate various emergency measures to be taken by
various organizations.”41 The 3.11 earthquake indeed qualified as high damage and thus, the
Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters headed by the Prime Minister was established
within 30 minutes at 15:14 on March 11.42 According to the agency, twelve meetings were held
within one week after the first shock for “mainly coordination and promoting collaboration
among relevant organizations,” whereas “actual disaster response operations were conducted by
individual ministries or local governments.”43 In general, the headquarter as an ad hoc
committee was composed of several officers and politicians in line with the spirit of Japan’s
parliamentary system which emphasizes collaborative decision-making rather than unilateral
rule.
The major collaboration between the headquarters and the local governments constituted
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rescuing survivors. Soon after the main shock, the local governments appointed and collaborated
with policemen, fire fighters, the coast guard and the Self-Defense Forces to engage in rescue
operations. Aside from these forces, the national headquarters and neighboring prefectures also
played important roles. Itoko Suzuki, author of the book How Was 3.11 Managed, writes that
“inland municipal fire headquarters near the disaster areas dispatched their personnel to rescue
and relief operations based on the firefighting mutual support agreements,” and “a gross total
force of approximately 389,000 officers and Inter-Prefectural Emergency Rescue Units (IERUs)
from across the nation were dispatched to support Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima.”44 According
to the final report by the headquarters, 27,157 people were rescued in total, with 3,749 rescued
by the Police Department, 5,064 by Fire Fighters, 360 by Japan Coast Guard, and 19,286 by the
Self Defense Forces.45 It was very impressive that so many people were successfully rescued
from the collapsed buildings or picked up from the sea. The huge success in rescue has to give its
credits towards the collaboration between the central headquarter and the local governments.
In addition to the cooperation between different regions and levels of government, the nongovernment organizations and volunteers also played important roles in disaster relief following
the 3.11 Earthquake. According to the Japan National Council for Social Welfare, within 6
months of the earthquake, 785,100 volunteers engaged in disaster relief and post-disaster
reconstruction activities in the Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima, the three prefectures that suffered
most from the disaster.46 Up to July 2016, a total of around 1.5 million volunteers have
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supported the disaster-affected areas. Many NGOs also engaged actively in collecting donations
from all over the country. The Red Cross, for example, has distributed 338, 099, 054, 472 yen to
the disaster-affected areas for usage of disaster relief activities.47 As early as March 12, an
announcement for fundraising led by a group of NPOs was published on Asahi Shinbun, one of
the leading newspapers in Japan, in order to support the disaster-affected areas.48 In general, a
large number of people were mobilized, and numerous supplies were collected from all over the
country. This shows that in addition to the effort of central and local governments, local citizens
also played important roles in disaster relief effort.
In general, both the central government and the local governments did a decent job during
the disaster relief period following the procedures designated by law. Indeed, the most
troublesome and controversial aspect of the government’s response towards 3.11 Earthquake was
something extremely unexpected and unusual for an earthquake: the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
disaster. The failure of the central government to disclose critical information created significant
doubt and panic among citizens, especially those who lived in Fukushima. Due to the
unsuccessful cooling down of the nuclear reactors and the destruction of the facility by the
tsunami, several explosions took place at the nuclear power plant that caused significant nuclear
leakage which was later ranked a level 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale, equivalent to
the Chernobyl disaster and considered as the most dangerous level.49 Several hours after the
nuclear leakage took place, Prime Minister Kan Naoto declared a nuclear emergency in
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Fukushima at 7:03pm, acknowledging the disaster but still telling people in Fukushima to remain
at home and follow the TV and radio news for further instruction. He urged people not to
evacuate and to remain calm because “no radioactivity was leaking from the power plant.”50
Itoko Suzuki points out that the Governor of Fukushima, regardless of the declaration, instructed
the two Towns within 2 km of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station to evacuate at
8:50pm. At 9:23pm, the Prime Minister withdrew his earlier statement and instructed those
residing within 3 km to evacuate, but still ordered those residing within 10 km to remain at
home. On March 12 at 5:44am, the Prime Minister made another speech and urged those who
lived within 10 km radius to evacuate. The evacuation zone was later extended to 20 km on
March 13, and three days later on March 15 at 11:00am, the Prime Minister extended the
evacuation zone the last time and instructed residents of 20-30 km to take indoor refuge.51
Since explosions continued to occur between March 12 and March 15, and that the
investigation was still going on, it was understandable for the government to extend the
evacuation zone over and over again.52 However, the major medias, TV stations and radios who
received minimal information from the government and the Tokyo Electric Power Company
(TEPCO) were not able to disclose critical information about the influence of the disaster due to
the lack of transparency of the investigation process.53 What was published on newspapers by
March 15 were simply the updated instructions to evacuate further, the speculation of the
situation, and the prediction of “a disastrous impact”—there wasn’t any detailed, confirmed
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information on how the investigation went.54 The information confused citizens to a great extent
and generated panic in the Japanese society. This accident, in general, revealed how a central
government with great control over critical information could cause huge problems during
natural disasters. Public trust in the central government also dropped significantly after this
accident.55

Political Reforms
Roughly one year after the natural disasters took place, both the Japanese and American
governments finished their investigation and analysis of their failure in the disaster relief period.
In response to these failures, the two governments introduced several policy reforms to either
revise the previous laws, or create new methods in dealing with natural disasters. In this section,
we will analyze the reforms carried out or proposed in the two countries, and how different
factors have influenced such decisions.
First of all, we need to get an overview of all the reforms that either took place or were
proposed after the disaster relief period. The Japanese government carried out two major reforms
in June and September 201256: 1) the amendment of the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act,57
and 2) the promulgation of Establishment Act of Nuclear Regulatory Commission.58 Besides
these laws enacted by the DPJ government, the LDP also proposed the Draft Amendment to the
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Constitution of Japan in April 2012 which illustrated how they believed the government should
change based on the lessons learnt.59 Although the Draft Amendment has not been passed yet,
since its victory in December 2012 election, the LDP has been continuously propagating for it in
campaigns. In the U.S, the central government enacted the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act in August 2006 in response to their failures during the evacuation and disaster relief
periods.60 The Act brought about three major changes: 1) a higher qualification requirement for
the Administrator of FEMA, 2) establishment of Directors for Preparedness and Response, and
3) the strengthened authority of the President in case of emergency.
After recognizing the reforms, the second step is to identify the causes of these changes.
Just like in the previous section, the nature of the natural disasters influenced the political
reforms greatly. Besides that, as we have discussed in the background section, there are another
three contingent factors that largely influenced the decision-making process for policy reforms:
public opinion and criticism, dynamics of political parties, and political interest of political
parties. The following analysis will focus on how these four factors have influenced the reforms
that took place in Japan and the U.S.
In both the U.S and Japan, several policy changes were made explicitly to address the
specific type(s) of disasters that occurred. In the U.S, the establishment of a Director for
Preparedness and a Director for Response and Recovery in FEMA is clearly a response due to
the nature of a disaster precipitated by a hurricane. One of the special features of a hurricane is
that it is highly predictable. According to the timeline from the governmental report, Katrina was
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already discovered by the meteorological agencies on August 23 as a tropical storm two days
before its landfall in Florida. Three hours before landfall on August 25, its status was elevated to
the level of a hurricane. Almost the same time as Hurricane made its landfall in Florida, it’s
possibility to hit neighboring states including Louisiana became almost certain.61 This was still
four days before it made the real landfall in Louisiana on August 29. Apparently, there was a long
interval between the announcement or forecast of the hurricane and the moment that it makes its
final landfall, which allowed the government to prepare by evacuating people, building levees,
and providing shelters. Due to the government’s failure in preparation, one of the major parts of
the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act focused on the aspect of preparedness and
the efficiency of evacuation. Two additional divisions of FEMA were created, with two
divisional directors to exclusively “coordinate and support precautionary evacuations and
recovery efforts”62 including “providing transportation assistance for relocating and returning
individuals displaced from their residences in a major disaster,”63 an apparently direct response
to the deficient of preparation for Hurricane Katrina. In this case, the central government’s power
is strengthened.
The earthquake in Japan, in contrast, provided no time for preparation before its occurrence.
Because of that, in preparation for earthquakes, the government must focus on building stronger
houses, educating the public, and strengthening the rescuing procedures. Indeed, since Japan has
countless earthquakes, it has built a considerably well-functioning system in all of these areas.
The distinction of the 3.11 Earthquake, however, was not just the earthquake itself, but the
tsunami and then the Fukushima nuclear crisis. To deal with an explosion in a nuclear power
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plant, a government needs skillful engineers to cool down the reactor and experts to measure and
estimate the damage of the nuclear radiation in order to mandate the radius of evacuation zone.
Thus in order to manage disaster relief after nuclear power plant explosions, on June 27, 2012,
the Japanese government established the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, a committee that
works exclusively on nuclear crisis. According to the White Paper of Disaster Management in
Japan, 2015 (Summary), the government later revised two relevant Acts in September of the
same year on nuclear power,64 which “resulted in the construction of a new government
framework for nuclear disaster management.”65 In general, the Japanese government also paid
close attention to the special features of their disaster, and placed the solution to the problems
caused by such aspects a top priority when they reformed the past system.
Besides the features of the disasters, criticism from the public also triggered many reforms
and revisions of laws. In the U.S, because of the miscommunication between FEMA and the state
of Louisiana and the inefficiency of evacuation and preparation caused by such
miscommunication, both the head of FEMA and the governor of the state faced significant
criticism. The former Director of FEMA, Michael Brown, ended up resigning on September 12,
2005 and his ability and qualification as the Director of FEMA came under heavy scrutiny.66
According to a CNN poll published on September 13, “a majority of respondents (54 percent)
had an unfavorable view of former FEMA Director Michael Brown, compared to 19 percent who
had a favorable opinion and 27 percent who were unsure.”67 One of the major reforms of
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FEMA, the higher qualification requirement for the Director, was an obvious response to
Brown’s performance. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Act specified a series of
qualifications such as “having no less than five years of executive leadership and management
experience” as well as responsibilities including but not limited to reporting routinely and in
timely fashion to designated officials including the president.68 What is more, the last major
reform included in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, the amendment of
Stafford Act which strengthened the president’s power, was also in response to the failure of
FEMA’s Director. The amendment to the Stafford Act allowed the president to “(1) authorize
precautionary evacuations; and (2) provide accelerated federal support in the absence of a
specific request and expanded assistance to state and local governments in recovery.”69
Although the amendment may seem to be unrelated to FEMA, it indeed served as a backup plan
in case FEMA and individual state(s) go into the deadlock again. Generally, the U.S government
decided to strengthen the central power in response to the criticism.
In Japan, the criticism was largely directed towards the governmental response towards the
Fukushima Nuclear Crisis. The delay of the evacuation caused by the orders of the central
government, the concealing of inspection progress, and the failure to provide enough information
and data to the general public which created panic in the first 5 days of the disaster were all
targets of critiques. According to Richard J. Samuels, “in an August 2011 survey, nearly 60
percent identified the central government as the least reliable source of information after a
disaster—up more than 22 percent from a survey taken before 3.11—and more than one-fifth
identified prefectures and municipalities as the most reliable sources of disaster information.”70
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The government realized its failure and followed the public demand by making reforms
accordingly. On June 27, 2012, the government published an amendment to the Disaster
Countermeasures Basic Act, which focused on three main reforms: “strengthening
responsiveness to large-scale disasters,” “improving response to victims in large-scale wide area
disasters,” and “improving disaster prevention education and enhance regional disaster
prevention capabilities.”71 The main functions of these three reforms, in brief, are to grant the
local government more power to collect critical information after a disaster, to strengthen a local
government’s ability to receive relief goods after the disaster, and to educate local people with
localized knowledge in order to enhance the local residents’ capability for mutual assistance in
case of a natural disaster. Clearly, all of these reforms aimed to strengthen the local government
in order to prevent the central government from harming the local communities through wrong
instructions. This is a perfect match with the demand of the general public.
The first two factors, the nature of disaster and the public opinion, are in most cases
reasonable and justifiable reasons to stimulate reforms. The other two factors, dynamics and
political interest of political parties, could also produce certain political outcomes that are not as
justifiable. There is one proposed reform in Japan that fell into the latter category: the Draft
Amendment to the Constitution of Japan proposed by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in
April 2012 which is still yet to pass. It included a crucial amendment to the Constitution to grant
emergency power to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet: Article 99(1) suggests that in case of
emergency, the Cabinet Orders would have the same effect as laws.72 Clearly, this is
contradictory to the opinion poll of Japanese people which suggested that they would like to
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reduce the central government’s power.
How does a revision of Japanese Constitution serve to the benefit of the LDP’s political
interest? As we have touched on already, the Japanese Constitution has never been amended 70
years after its establishment. However, it has always been the LDP’s political goal to revise the
Constitution. According to Lawrence Repeta, one of the leading scholars in the study of
Constitutional amendments in Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party has been advocating for
fundamental revision of Japan’s Constitution since its founding in 1955, and the reason was that
the LDP leaders felt humiliated by the fact that the country is governed under a constitution
largely drafted by foreign military officers.73 As a conservative and nationalist party, it has been
constantly striving for a “real Japanese Constitution” that would allow them to establish a sense
of “real independence” as Japanese.
The next puzzle to solve is why the LDP choose that specific time after 3.11 Earthquake to
propose the Draft Amendment. For the past decades, the LDP had never been able to secure two
thirds of the seats in both houses in order to push forward such institutional changes. However,
with the 3.11 Earthquake, their chance came.
In the U.S, the Democratic Party and the Republic Party generally take turns in capturing
the presidency and controlling the Congress. Since both parties have abundant political
experiences as well as numerous failures, even if one party fails once, it is unlikely to suddenly
lose completely in the next election. However, the relationship between parties in Japan is very
different. 2011 was only the starting of the second year after the DPJ eventually became the first
single party to defeat the LDP’s monopoly in politics in the postwar Japanese history. Just as we
have discussed above, the DPJ and the central government was facing extremely strong criticism
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after the 3.11 Earthquake. Even though the former Prime Minister, Kan Naoto, took several
decisive actions to reduce nuclear power and had made his public appearances very much against
the usage of nuclear power, he still wasn’t able to manage to recover the loss of popularity for
both him and his party as a whole.74 Since there was not really a third choice in Japanese
politics, and that the LDP has always been considered as the more experienced and almost the
“default” ruling party, it was natural for the LDP to benefit from the unpopularity of DPJ in the
2012 general election. In fact, the LDP won a landslide in the 2012 general elections even with a
decrease in votes for their party.75 They purely benefited from the fact that a large number of
people who previously supported the DPJ did not vote in the 2012 election. It was exactly the
unpopularity of the DPJ which encouraged the LDP to propose the Draft Amendment. Since the
DPJ was losing power significantly, it was the best moment for the LDP to propose something
that would not likely to be supported by the majority of the general public.

Conclusion
Following the analyses throughout the paper, we were able to identify a total of seven factors
that played important roles in determining the disaster relief procedures and political reforms in
response to the governmental failures: 1) system of government on the central level, 2) centrallocal power balance and 3) distribution of emergency power influenced the former; 4) public
opinion and criticism, 5) dynamics of political parties, and 6) political interest of political parties
influenced the latter; whereas 7) the nature of the disasters had an impact on both. This section
will first evaluate the most influential factors that caused governmental failures in the disaster
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relief period, then make a judgement on the factors that drove political leaders to pursue certain
policy reforms. The current political situation in Japan in regards to these reforms will also be
touched upon at the end.
For the disaster relief period, although factors 1, 2, 3 and 7 were all influential, not all of
them were responsible for the governmental failures. In the U.S, factors 2, 3 and 7 all contributed
to the governmental failures, whereas in Japan factor 7 had the largest damage on the reputation
of the Japanese government.
Factor 1, system of government on the central level, though being fundamental for a
political system, has little influence on the failure of governmental response in both countries. In
the U.S case, President Bush quickly responded to Hurricane Katrina by approving or
announcing declarations of emergency of state in several states that suffered from Hurricane
Katrina. In Japan, the collective decision-making process in a parliamentary system would
theoretically delay the response towards natural disasters, but with abundant experiences, the
central government of Japan established the temporary emergency headquarters and started
disaster relief procedures very quickly.
For factor 2, the balance of power between local and central governments, the conflict
between Governor Blanco and Director Brown revealed the central-local conflict in the U.S. This
conflict caused the evacuation process to be largely delayed, which was one of the most
significant failures of the U.S government during the disaster relief period of Hurricane Katrina.
In the Japanese case, the stable collaboration between local and central government on the
disaster relief period for the earthquake went on fairly well, at least for the response towards the
earthquake. Similarly, factor 3, the distribution of emergency power, has also been balanced out
between the federal and state governments in the U.S. When the federal and state governments
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had conflicts, it also undermined the evacuation process in the state of Louisiana. In Japan,
however, the burden of disaster relief lies on the local governments. During the disaster relief
period, local governments and volunteers as well as non-profit organizations worked together
closely as a collective force and thus the disaster relief procedure went on very well. In general, a
combination of factor 2 and factor 3 played very critical roles in causing the governmental
failure in the U.S.
Factor 7 of fundamental difference between disasters was responsible for most of the
governmental failures in Japan's case, since the unprecedented nuclear crisis was completely out
of the capacity of the regular disaster relief procedures. As a result, the central government failed
to evacuate residents and handle the investigation in a timely manner. In the U.S, the feature of
the hurricane was also partly responsible for the governmental failure. For a hurricane, even if
some residents are not evacuated, they could still survive with adequate shelter and supplies.
However, due to the governmental failures including the collapse of the levees and inadequate
shelter, tremendous deaths were caused.
For the policy reform period, 4) public opinion and criticism, 5) dynamics of political
parties, 6) political interest of political parties, and 7) the nature of the disasters all played
important roles in determining some of the established or proposed policy reforms. Among these,
factors 4 and 7 influenced political reforms in both countries, and those reforms were lessons that
almost anyone could take from the experience. On the other hand, factors 5 and 6 only
influenced the LDP’s proposed reform in Japan, which is a conclusion that depended on
contingent and particular political configurations.
Factor 4, the public opinion and criticism, was responsible for many reforms in both
countries. In the U.S, FEMA's higher qualification requirement and the strengthened power of

33

the President both responded to the public criticism of the ineffectiveness of FEMA and the
deadlock between federal and state governments during the disaster. In Japan, the DPJ
government established amendments to previous laws and yielded more autonomy for the local
governments in case of natural disasters in response to the criticism for the central government
holding too much power while dealing with the nuclear crisis.
Factor 7, difference between disasters, also played important roles in determining the types
and focuses of the reform. In the U.S, FEMA was rearranged to add directors of preparedness,
response, recovery respectively, since evacuation before the hurricane’s landfall is the major
focus of government response towards a hurricane. In Japan, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission
was established to exclusively deal with nuclear crisis from then on.
A combination of factors 5 and 6 explains the real reason for why the LDP demands for a
constitutional change, and why it chose to do it at the certain time: with the LDP’s political goal
to amend the Constitution, and the fact that it would inevitably benefit from the unpopularity of
DPJ after the 3.11 Earthquake and win the 2012 General Election, it found April 2012 the best
time to propose its Draft Amendment to the Constitution of Japan which demanded for more
power given to the central government.
Now the original question is answered: the DPJ was making judgements and decisions
based on careful investigation of the governmental failures during the 3.11 Earthquake, whereas
the LDP was indeed making its statement based on its own political interest. Based on different
political factors and the overall differences in the natural disasters, it is indeed logical for Japan
and the U.S to come to different conclusions: that the U.S has to strengthen the central
government, and Japan has to weaken its central government. However, though not a justifiable
conclusion of the lessons learnt from the 3.11 Earthquake, the Draft Amendment proposed by the
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LDP is still within governmental consideration today under the LDP government. It has been
doing really well in the past four years since the 2012 General Election.
The LDP won the election in 2012 regardless of the fact that it actually gained less votes
than in 2009. Since then, the party led by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo had been constantly
fighting for the chance for their amendment to come true. In fact, even though the LDP prevailed
the 2012 General Election and achieved a two-third majority in the lower house, it still had to
gain a majority in the upper house in order to push the Draft Amendment towards the next step: a
national referendum. In the upper house election in 2013, LDP continued its influence and gained
a large amount of seats, but still didn’t reach the two-third majority, since only half of the
Councillors would face election in each three years. As a result, it waited another three years
until another upper house election took place this year in July. This time, with the help of the
coalition consisting of Kōmeitō, Osaka Ishin no Kai, and a small party named Kokoro, the LDP
eventually managed to get only one above the number of Councillors that it needs for a
Constitutional Amendment76. Though the Draft Amendment contained many controversial
articles besides the emergency clause, a journal article from Japan Time77s, for example, argued
that “rather than targeting the Constitution’s pacifist Article 9, it seems the LDP will focus
instead on an emergency powers amendment.” Another journal article from Mainichi Shinbun78
also indicates that since the other amendments are either too hard to achieve or not powerful
enough, the emergency clause would very likely be Abe’s target to start his Constitutional
Amendment.
Digital News of Asahi Newspaper 朝日新聞デジタル. 2016 House of Councilors election「2016 参院選」.
July 2016. <http://www.asahi.com/senkyo/senkyo2016/>
77
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Japan Times. July 8, 2016. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/08/national/politics-diplomacy/ruling-blocmay-push-emergency-powers-amendment-constitution-sundays-poll/#.WCV6aygrKUk>
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Mainichi Japan. “Abe gov't looks to add emergency clause for major disasters to Constitution.” The Mainichi.
January 1, 2016. <http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160101/p2a/00m/0na/010000c>
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By far, the LDP has already gotten enough seats for pushing forward its Draft Amendment.
No actions have been taken by Abe yet since he has time until the re-election of the lower house
in December 2018. What he and the LDP will do remains unknown. Though polls have indicated
that a slight majority of people are against any radical revisions, whether this amendment of
emergency clause will be passed with the political dynamics of the continuing unpopularity of
the DPJ, or get rejected with a logical conclusion from the disasters that took place also is still
hard to predict. This will be left for the future to decide.
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